The Wall Street Journal Friday – Sunday. October 24 – 26, 2014, Page 2Russia and West Grapple With Alternate Realities
It Isn’t Just Opinions That Differ, But Facts Too
When the chairman and chief executive of Total SA, Christophe de Margerie , was killed this week after his private jet hit a snow-removal truck on takeoff from a Moscow airport, it looked like an accident.
Aha!!! als also der Chefe von TOTAL Christophe de Margerie (Gott möge ihn segnen und schenke ihm Heil, RIP) getötet wurde, sah es [zunächst] wie ein Unfall aus.
Russian television viewers were treated to a different version. According to a top Russian television channel, a plot by the Central Intelligence Agency couldn’t be ruled out. Mr. de Margerie was, after all, a prominent opponent of U.S. and European Union sanctions on Moscow, and Washington wanted him silenced. This story was relayed not by an outraged nationalist pundit but by a newscaster.
Die russischen Fernsehzuschauer wurden also mit einer anderen Version bearbeitet. „ein Anschlag, ein Komplott, eine Verschwörung durch die CIA sei nicht auszuschließen, denn schließlich war Margerie ein prominenter Widersacher der Sanktionen der USA und Europas gegen Russland und Washington wollte ihn zum Schweigen bringen.
The report illustrates a development that is becoming increasingly evident: Russians and Westerners are talking past each other. It isn’t just that they have different opinions about the same event; it is that they believe in a different set of facts.
Europäer und Russen haben also nicht nur verschiedene Meinungen über ein und dasselbe Ereignis, sondern glauben auch an einen anderen Sachverhalt.
It is like “two people in a dark room,” said an American participant at a Valdai Club conference near Sochi this week that brings together Russian officials and academics with Western experts.
Das ähnelt also dem Umstand, wie wenn zwei Leute sich in einem dunklen Raum befinden.
Nowhere is this more apparent than over events in Ukraine. To a vast majority of Russians, the ouster of former President Viktor Yanukovych in February was a coup that had the direct support of European politicians and was fomented by Western intelligence agencies. For Westerners, Mr. Yanukovych fled under pressure from a popular movement that sought closer relations with the West.
Nirgends wird dies sichtbarer als beim Krieg in der Ukraine. Für die Mehrheit der Russen, war also die Amtsenthebung (sic!) des Präsidenten Viktor Janukowitsch im Februar [2014] ein Staatsstreich und Putsch, der direkt von Europa unterstützt wurde und durch westliche Geheimdienste angefacht und durchgeführt wurde. Für uns sei aber Jaunkowitsch unter dem Druck einer Bewegung geflohen, die eine engere Anbindung an den Westen sucht.
The stories Russians are hearing from a media that is increasingly under state control is fueling the popularity of President Vladimir Putin , who addresses the Valdai meeting on Friday. Support for him runs above 80%, even in previously Putin-skeptic Moscow.
Ah & Oha! Die Geschichten, die die Russen von den Medien, die zunehmend unter der Kontrolle des Staates steht feuern die Begeisterung für Präsident Wladimir Putin an. [Das würde die Presse der USA für Präsident Hussein natürlich nie machen!]
The Putin personality cult appears to be rising. Vyacheslav Volodin, first deputy chief of staff to the president, told the conference Wednesday that Western “attacks against Putin are attacks against Russia.”
Der Personenkult um Putin steigert sich (ins Unermessliche?), weil der Stabschef des Präsidenten gesagt hat, dass „Angriffe gegen Putin, Anschläge gegen Russland sind!“ …
He went on to say that Russia’s people understand “that if there is no Putin, there is no Russia.”
… und die Leute Russlands begriffen haben: „ohne Putin keine Russland“
Mr. Volodin made the remarks off the record but the comments were leaked, apparently by satisfied aides, to the Russian press.
Mr. Volodin’s remarks spurred political pundit Stanislav Belkovskiy, a Putin critic, to tell the independent Ekho Moskvy radio station: “The search for Russia’s national idea, which began after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is finally over. Now it is obvious that Russia’s national idea is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin as an individual.”
Und vom einem unbekannten Kritiker Putins erfahren wir, dass die Suche nach nationaler Identität, die mit der Auflösung der Sowjetunion begann, jetzt vorbei ist. Es ist jetzt offenkundig, dass die nationale Identität in Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin als Mensch liegt.
It is hard to imagine that identification between state and ruler being made in the U.S. or Western Europe, in private or in public. It is another illustration of how those in power in Russia think differently from their counterparts in the West.
Es könne sich nur schwer vorgestellt werden, dass man in den USA oder West-Europa privat oder öffentlich Staat und Herrscher als identisch betrachte.
‘Without trust, you have suspicion, and with suspicion you think that everything the other side does is against your interests.’
The Russian conspiracy theory isn’t a new phenomenon. A senior Russian security official, Nikolai Patrushev, rehearsed a couple of historical theories in a recent interview with state media: that the U.S. lured the Soviet Union into its disastrous invasion of Afghanistan and that Washington manipulated the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s to destroy the Soviet Union. Likewise, the new sanctions against Russia are seen as a U.S. effort to bring about regime-change in Russia.
Some of the stories Russians tell themselves derive from their singular culture. One participant said Russia’s repeated ability to rise from disaster to greatness, as he claimed it is doing again, can only have “irrational” and “mystical” explanations.
Ivan Krastev, who heads the Bulgarian think tank Centre for Liberal Strategies, said relying on conspiracy stories doesn’t provide a framework for moving forward. “Marxism was an ideology,” he said. “Conspiracy theories are not an ideology.”
Robert Skidelsky, the biographer of Keynes and a professor at the University of Warwick who is attending the conference, questioned where this promotion of an alternative reality is leading Russia.
He said that behind Russia’s narratives lie three possibilities: that Russian officials believe they are telling the truth; that they are lying; or, that they are deceiving themselves.
If Russian officials are basing their actions on false premises, they are taking risks, he said. If they are lying or deceiving themselves, they are severely eroding Russia’s international credibility—as Western governments argue they have by claiming that the armed “little green men” in Ukraine haven’t been sent there by the Russian military.
Igor Ivanov, the former Russian foreign minister, says Moscow’s position has developed because of a disappearance of trust between the West and Russia.
“We have lost trust,” he said in an interview on the sidelines of the conference. “Without trust, you have suspicion, and with suspicion you think that everything the other side does is against your interests.”
He has proposed a “contact group” to discuss Ukraine that would bring the Kiev government together with Russia, the U.S., Poland, Germany, France and the U.K. Other regular contacts between Russia and the West are needed to deal with a host of mutual problems, including the rise of Islamic State in Iraq, he said.
But he’s not optimistic. “The situation has become very personalized,” he said. Bridging the chasm between the West and Russia requires political will. “And I don’t see the political will on either side.”
—Alan Cullison in Moscow contributed to this article.

Hat dies auf Aussiedlerbetreuung und Behinderten – Fragen rebloggt.
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Hat dies auf Aussiedlerbetreuung und Behinderten – Fragen rebloggt.
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